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Cyprus: Are the Turkish Cypriots Inching Toward Independence?

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An Intelligence Assessment

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EUR 83-10262C

November 1983

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Erratum

Notice to recipients of *Cyprus: Are the Turkish Cypriots Inching Toward Independence?* EUR 83-10262C, [] November 1983.

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The photo on page 7 was incorrectly labeled "Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash." It should have read "Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash." []

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [] of the
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Western Europe Division, EURA, []

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EUR 83-10262C

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**Cyprus: Are the
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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 27 October 1983
was used in this report.*

Tension is rising again on Cyprus as a result of renewed Turkish Cypriot threats to declare independence and Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rejection of the latest UN initiative. We believe that much of the recent Turkish Cypriot bluster has been aimed at forcing Cypriot President Kyprianou to attend a summit meeting with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash in early 1984. At the same time, however, we note growing indications that the Turkish Cypriots are considering the independence option more seriously than in the past. More important, there are signs that Ankara, which has restrained the Turkish Cypriots from taking such a step in the past, may be reevaluating its policy.

We believe some creative diplomacy by the United Nations, the United States, and other Western governments will be required over the next few months to ensure the success of the summit and ultimately get negotiations back on track. Failure of the summit, in our view, could be the trigger for a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots would consider a unilateral declaration of independence as an extreme provocation and almost certainly would believe the United States had acquiesced in the decision. Consequently, US-Greek and US-Cypriot relations probably would reach their lowest point since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Moreover, the likely Western criticism and censoring actions against the Turks and Turkish Cypriots that would result from a unilateral declaration of independence could prompt Ankara to reduce its ties to the United States and NATO. In a worst case scenario, the United States could be denied access to facilities in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and tension between Greece and Turkey could erupt into open conflict—to the ultimate detriment of NATO interests.

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
EUR 83-10262C

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Cyprus: Are the Turkish Cypriots Inching Toward Independence?

Cyprus is a particularly complicated and sensitive problem because it involves not only the internecine struggle between the two major ethnic groups on the island but also the regional interests of two key US allies—Greece and Turkey—along with strategic considerations in the Eastern Mediterranean that affect both superpowers. Because of the complexity of the problem, we have chosen to organize this discussion around a series of questions designed to provide background information, sort out the key issues surrounding recent Turkish Cypriot threats to declare independence, and offer an assessment of the impact that Turkish Cypriot independence would have on US interests in the area. []

What are the roots of the Cyprus problem?

The island of Cyprus has been a problem area since the 1950s when it was a British colony and the Greek Cypriots, with the diplomatic backing of Greece, began fighting for self-determination. Initially, self-determination meant *enosis* (union) with Greece, although eventually it became a byword for independence. The Turkish Cypriots generally supported the British, but later, with the encouragement of Turkey, they began to agitate for *taksim* (partition) or at a minimum a biregional federation. Britain, Greece, and Turkey negotiated a compromise precluding union with Greece or partition and making Cyprus an independent state in 1960 []

The terms of independence, however, were controversial. The Constitution, drawn up by Britain, Greece, and Turkey without Cypriot participation, proved unworkable, and the treaties attached to the basic agreement, which were meant to guarantee the island's independence, only enhanced the potential for interference by the treaty signatories. (Under one of the treaties, for example, both Greece and Turkey were permitted to station troops on Cyprus; another treaty allowed the three signatories to intervene in

order to "maintain the status quo" in Cyprus.) Intercommunal fighting between the Greek Cypriot majority (about 78 percent of the population) and the Turkish Cypriot minority (about 18 percent of the population) broke out in 1963-64 and again in 1967. On both occasions, US diplomatic intervention prevented a Turkish invasion that could have led to war between Greece and Turkey. []

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The problem was brought to a head in July 1974 when Greek Cypriot rightists, backed by the military junta in Athens, mounted a coup against President Makarios. The resulting puppet regime lasted only a few days, but it nonetheless triggered an invasion of Cyprus by Turkey during July and August. When the dust settled, Turkish troops had secured some 37 percent of northern Cyprus for the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots living in the north fled south while Turkish Cypriots moved to the north. An uneasy truce has existed since then. []

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The Greek Cypriots, who constitute the only internationally recognized government, have carried their case to international forums, most notably the United Nations, in an effort to get Turkish troops out of Cyprus. They have pressed for a federal solution based on a strong central government and for guaranteed freedom of movement (which would give them access to agricultural land in northern Cyprus and enable many of the 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes). The Turkish Cypriots meanwhile have pushed for a biregional state with a decentralized government (which would give them exclusive control over a portion of the island). []

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The problem has been complicated by the interest of Greece and Turkey in the plight of their Cypriot compatriots. Failure to find a solution has become an

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unending source of tension between Greece and Turkey. This tension has weakened the southern flank of NATO and repeatedly forces the United States to try to balance the objectives of two important allies. []

What is the present status of negotiations between the two Cypriot communities?

After the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, talks between the two communities aiming at a negotiated settlement were resumed under UN auspices. They have been held intermittently since then but have led to little real movement. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots want to continue negotiations under the terms of a 1981 UN plan designed to focus initially on the less controversial issues in an effort to make step-by-step progress toward an overall settlement. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots favor the initiative that UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar mounted in August 1983 because it comes closer to their desire for a "global" approach, under which all the major issues would be tackled before reaching agreement on any one part of a settlement. []

— In November 1981 the then UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, presented an "evaluation document" for consideration by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The document outlined the points on which the two sides appeared to agree and those on which they disagreed. The UN objective was to provide a framework for discussions and to focus initial attention on the less controversial issues. UN officials hoped that agreement on the small issues would build good will and eventually result in meaningful talks on the more important questions. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots were generally well disposed toward the 1981 plan, but the Greek Cypriots thought the approach favored the Turkish side and complained about the slowness of the process. Negotiations quickly bogged down in details with both sides haggling over semantic differences. The talks were interrupted during the campaign leading up to Cypriot Presidential elections in February 1983 and were halted prior to the UN General Assembly debate on Cyprus in May 1983. No talks have been held for the last six months. []

— In an effort to break the stalemate and inject new life into the negotiations, UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar offered new UN "soundings" in August 1983. His initiative came as a surprise not only to the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots but also to the United States and other interested West Europeans. Western governments nonetheless rallied behind the initiative and encouraged the feuding parties to respond favorably. The initiative directly confronted the most controversial issues—in particular the distribution of territory, the nature of the federal executive, and the composition of the legislature—and provided a framework for their discussion. It also allowed for the possibility of adding new issues to the list. []

— In late September the Greek Cypriots accepted the Secretary General's personal involvement and approach to the problem while noting certain substantive reservations over content. According to USUN mission and Embassy reporting, UN officials were encouraged by President Kyprianou's generally positive response, despite political infighting over the proposal within the Greek Cypriot community. []

— The Turks and Turkish Cypriots rejected both the framework and the substance of the Perez De Cuellar initiative. Although they did not object strongly to Perez De Cuellar's personal involvement, they insisted that intercommunal negotiations resume under the framework of the 1981 plan. []

Is it possible to get negotiations back on track? Is the proposed summit between President Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash a possible way out of the current impasse?

Momentum for a UN-sponsored summit sometime in January 1984 appears to be growing. We believe its success or failure will largely determine whether negotiations between the two communities resume or

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whether Turkish Cypriot threats to declare independence become a reality. Thus, in our view, the next two to six months represent an important transitional period and one in which the diplomatic activity of UN officials and other interested parties could play a critical role. We believe some creative diplomacy will be required in order to bring the expectations of the two communities closer together, ensure the success of the summit, and ultimately get the negotiations back on track. Without adequate preparation, the summit, in our judgment, could be a prelude to Turkish Cypriot independence. [redacted]

- After rejecting the Perez De Cuellar proposals early this month, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash advanced the notion of a summit. [redacted]



[redacted] we believe Ankara will not allow Denktash to proceed with independence before at least trying the summit. If the two sides fail to agree on modus operandi for resuming negotiations, the possibility of the Turkish Cypriots declaring independence—with Ankara's blessing—will increase significantly. [redacted]

- According to Embassy and USUN mission reporting, the Secretary General is actively promoting the summit on the condition that both sides agree to adequate advance preparation and a predetermined agenda. In addition, the Secretary General has cautioned that he will not convene a summit unless he believes it has a reasonable chance of success. [redacted]
- Denktash's use of the summit proposal as an ultimatum has increased Greek Cypriot suspicions about Turkish Cypriot intentions. After some initial misgivings, however, President Kyprianou in late October accepted the summit idea as well



UN Secretary General Javier Perez De Cuellar

as the Secretary General's conditions. In conversations with US and UN officials, the Greek Cypriots have indicated their preference for a fixed agenda and have insisted that it not include Denktash's demand for "equal partnership"—in their view a tactic aimed at gaining some measure of recognition in the international community. (The Greek Cypriots have long believed international recognition is their only effective advantage over the Turkish Cypriots, and they almost certainly would rebuff any attempt to water down their status as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus.) [redacted]

- The Turkish Cypriots are insisting on an open agenda. In addition, Denktash has said he will not agree to resume the intercommunal talks unless the Greek Cypriots relinquish their provisional seats in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and accept the Turkish Cypriots as "equal partners." [redacted]

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The 1974 Cyprus Crisis and Its Repercussions: A Chronology

- 15 Jul 74 *Coup d'etat backed by military junta in Athens leads to temporary downfall of Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus.*
- 20 Jul 74 *Turkey invades Cyprus.*
- 20 Jul 74 *UN Security Council unanimously passes resolution calling for a cease-fire and negotiations.*
- 23 Jul 74 *Rightist puppet regime in Cyprus collapses and Glafkos Clerides becomes Acting President until Archbishop Makarios returns to island in December.*
- 23 Jul 74 *The military junta in Athens falls and Karamanlis is invited to return from self-imposed exile in France to head a Greek Government of national unity.*
- 25 Jul 74 *Britain, Greece, and Turkey begin Geneva talks aimed at enforcing a cease-fire and reaching a negotiated settlement.*
- 14 Aug 74 *Turkey begins a second major offensive on Cyprus, which lasts for two days. When dust settles, Turks control 37 percent of northern Cyprus.*
- 14 Aug 74 *Greece announces its withdrawal from the military wing of NATO in reaction to NATO's failure to halt the Turkish invasion, especially the second Turkish assault.*
- 19 Aug 74 *US Embassy in Nicosia is surrounded and US Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger Davies is killed by unidentified Greek Cypriot gunmen.*
- 19 Sep 74 *Members of US Congress introduce the first of several resolutions to cut off aid to Turkey as a result of its invasion of Cyprus. (Congress argues that Turkey has violated US laws governing the use of US-supplied arms and equipment.)*
- 1 Nov 74 *The UN General Assembly passes (117-0) the first of many resolutions calling for the speedy withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus, the safe return of refugees, and negotiations for a settlement.*
- 7 Dec 74 *Archbishop Makarios returns to Cyprus.*
- 17 Jan 75 *Greek Cypriots march on one of the British bases to protest British decision to release 10,000 Turkish Cypriots who have taken refuge at the base.*
- 4 Feb 75 *Turkish Government threatens to review its NATO ties and its bilateral relationship with the United States if a US arms embargo against Turkey is implemented.*
- 5 Feb 75 *US arms embargo against Turkey enters into force.*

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10 Feb 75	<i>Talks on US bases in Greece begin in Athens following Greece's demand to renegotiate the existing US-Greek base accord.</i>
13 Feb 75	<i>Turkish Cypriots set up a separate local administration—the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus—in the north. It is not independent or internationally recognized.</i>
18 Feb 75	<i>Turkish liaison officers are withdrawn from the joint US-Turkish military mission in Ankara.</i>
21 Apr 75	<i>Demonstrators storm US Embassy in Athens to protest US bases in Greece.</i>
29 Apr 75	<i>Greece and United States announce termination of home-porting facilities in Greece and restrictions at US bases.</i>
25 Jul 75	<i>After a motion to lift US arms embargo against Turkey fails to pass the US House of Representatives, Ankara announces abrogation of 1969 US-Turkish base accord and begins gradual suspension of operations at US military facilities. (Five sites are immediately closed down.)</i>
2 Oct 75	<i>US Congress partially lifts arms embargo on Turkey.</i>
23 Dec 75	<i>The Chief of the CIA Station in Athens is killed by unidentified gunmen.</i>
29 Apr 77	<i>House of US Consul in Izmir, Turkey, is subjected to machinegun fire, and an unexploded bomb is found in garden.</i>
25 Jul 78	<i>US Senate votes to lift arms embargo against Turkey. US House of Representatives follows suit on 1 August 1978.</i>
9 Oct 78	<i>Turkey reopens four of US facilities previously shut down.</i>
14 Dec 79	<i>Four Americans (including one serviceman) killed by terrorists in Istanbul.</i>
29 Mar 80	<i>The United States and Turkey sign a new base accord that is more restrictive than the previous 1969 base agreement.</i>
24 Oct 80	<i>After strenuous NATO negotiations with Greece and Turkey, Athens reenters military wing of NATO under a complicated compromise arrangement. (Command and control issues continue to be a source of tension between Greece and Turkey and to disrupt NATO exercises in the Aegean.)</i>
15 Jul 83	<i>The United States and Greece initial a new base accord. It is placed before the Greek Parliament for debate and ratification in October/November 1983.</i>

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Are the Turkish Cypriots moving toward a unilateral declaration of independence?

We believe there are growing indications that the Turkish Cypriots are seriously considering declaring independence, a move that almost certainly would kill any hope of a negotiated settlement. Our belief is based on what we view as a change in the tone of Denktash's public and private statements and on Turkish Cypriot policy actions over the years that have tended to solidify the separation between the two communities. [redacted]

— Denktash has long advocated independence, but in recent months he has done so more vociferously. While traveling in Europe early this month, Denktash publicly accused Perez De Cuellar of playing a "double game" on Cyprus and threatened to declare independence if President Kyprianou refused his demand for a summit meeting. Although Denktash has since moderated his public statements [redacted]

[redacted]—he nonetheless has continued to threaten independence unless the Greek Cypriots acknowledge the Turkish Cypriot right to "self-determination" and "equal status." Press reporting makes clear that these statements have created an air of expectation within the Turkish Cypriot community. [redacted]

— In addition, US diplomatic reporting reveals that Denktash has been increasingly vehement in his private conversations with UN and US officials. In discussions with US officials early this month, he clearly hinted at the possibility of independence—arguing that in his view the Greek Cypriots only used negotiations as a means to keep the Turkish Cypriots stateless. [redacted]

— More important, however, a number of policy actions suggest a growing move toward independence. Since 1974, the Turkish Cypriot "Assembly" has passed several laws that have tended to reinforce the physical and psychological separation between the two communities. Within the past two years, for example, the Turkish lira has been introduced as the official currency in northern Cyprus, provisions have been made for the establishment of a Turkish Cypriot Central Bank, and titles to property once owned by Greek Cypriots have been formally transferred to Turkish

Cypriots. Following Greek Cypriot activity in the UN General Assembly last spring, the Turkish Cypriots passed a law affirming the Turkish Cypriot right of "self-determination." Two new laws are currently pending in the "Assembly." One would provide for a separate flag for northern Cyprus. The other would enable the "Assembly" to declare independence following a referendum—or without a referendum if Turkish Cypriot leaders were to conclude that a delay would be harmful to community interests. Although the enabling legislation appears to be on hold for the moment, its very consideration has heightened expectations among the Turkish Cypriots and increased anxiety among the Greek Cypriots. [redacted]

How much "control" does Ankara have over the Turkish Cypriots?

In our view, Ankara retains control over the major policy actions of the Turkish Cypriots, although it has less control over Denktash's public statements. Thus, a declaration of independence—and early steps in that direction—almost certainly would require Turkey's approval. Ankara exercises its control through its pervasive influence over the security, economic, and political life of the Turkish Cypriot community. Although Denktash is, no doubt, confident that Ankara would not abandon the Turkish Cypriots if they declared independence without consulting Turkey, he also knows that Ankara almost certainly would remove him from power for going against its wishes. [redacted]

— Turkey's troops on Cyprus constitute the only effective military force in the north.¹ The Turkish Cypriots' own security force is small, ill equipped, and poorly trained. [redacted]

¹ There is considerable uncertainty regarding the number of Turkish troops on Cyprus. [redacted]

[redacted] Embassy [redacted]
reporting has placed the strength at about 18,000. [redacted]

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Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou



Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş

- In addition, the Turkish Cypriots rely heavily on Ankara for economic support. In recent years, Turkey has supplied a half to two-thirds of the revenues for the Turkish Cypriot budget. [redacted]

Are we beginning to see a change in Turkish policy toward Cyprus?

Although Ankara has restrained Denktaş from declaring independence in the past, there are signs that it may be reevaluating its policy. The signs include Turkey's surprise rejection of the recent UN initiative—UN and US officials had expected Turkey to go along—and its diplomatic efforts to convince friendly governments that Ankara is "losing control" of the Turkish Cypriots. The apparent contradictions in reporting on Turkish intentions and the somewhat ambiguous statements from various Turkish officials in recent weeks also suggest that a policy review may be under way. [redacted] Embassy reporting indicates that there may be more divergence of opinion within the Turkish Government on the Cyprus issue than in the past. [redacted]

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- Ankara's rejection of the Perez De Cuellar proposal in late September surprised both UN and Western officials. During the preceding two months, Turkish authorities had appeared to be

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favorably inclined toward the initiative, which would have tackled head on the major controversial issues. Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen's firm rejection of the initiative in September was followed by a warning before the UN General Assembly that, if the Turkish Cypriots were denied "partnership" within a federal state, "they will have no other choice but to reshape their own destiny." [redacted]

- Over the past four months, Ankara has intensified its diplomatic efforts to convince friendly countries that it is "losing control" over Denktash and the Turkish Cypriots. In our view, Ankara may be positioning itself to deflect potential international criticism if and when independence is declared.

What might prompt Ankara to consider Turkish Cypriot independence as an option within the medium term? Would the Turks be concerned about international public opinion, and would they also consider the negative impact such action might have on US aid to Turkey?

In our judgment, Turkey is almost certainly aware of the potential costs of a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence. Experience has shown, however, that on occasion the Turks will disregard international public opinion if they believe their national interests dictate certain actions. In the case of Cyprus, Ankara's argument that it has "lost control" of Denktash probably would allow it to defuse some of the criticism. At this point, we can think of several factors—admittedly speculative—that might be causing the Turks to reevaluate their options on Cyprus. [redacted]

- The most compelling reason is probably the perception on the part of the Turks and Turkish Cypriots that the Greeks and Greek Cypriots are trying with some success to change the focus of the current negotiations. Press and Embassy reporting reveals that the Turks were particularly upset by the resolution passed by the UN General Assembly last May calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops. The Turks were also disturbed by Greek Cypriot efforts to secure seats in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in September. Although these actions were not significantly different from past Greek Cypriot actions within international forums, they were initiated after a two-year hiatus. [redacted]

[redacted] (For their part, the Greek Cypriots appear convinced that Turkey wants permanent partition or an indefinite perpetuation of the status quo.) [redacted]

- The Turkish military government may believe that its standing in international public opinion—especially in Western Europe—has already reached such a low point that a move on Cyprus would have little real impact. They may reason further that international public opinion is fickle and that relations with the West Europeans will improve over the longer term. [redacted]

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- To some extent, Turkish officials may dismiss the warnings of high-level US officials against a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence. At the beginning of October, the United States warned the Turks that a move toward Turkish Cypriot independence might harm the Turkish aid proposals before Congress.

the proposed summit. At the same time, we suspect that failure of the meeting could, in fact, precipitate—with Ankara's blessing—a Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence. Based on past Turkish behavior, we think that the United States will have little firm warning if and when Ankara gives the go-ahead to the Turkish Cypriots. Likewise, we believe Ankara will not be amenable to eleventh-hour appeals once a decision is made.

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- Finally, the domestic political situation in northern Cyprus may be causing Ankara to rethink its policy options. Denktash's term as "President" is nearing an end and the center-right coalition with which he is identified is in a shaky position politically as a result of attacks by the center left and the left. A declaration of independence probably would bolster Denktash's position in the short term.

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If the Turkish Cypriots follow through on their threats to declare independence, what would be the likely timing? How much warning would we have?

We believe Ankara will not allow the Turkish Cypriots to declare independence before at least trying the summit idea. Much of the ominous Turkish Cypriot rhetoric in recent weeks almost certainly represents efforts to jockey for a strong negotiating position in

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- At the same time, however, several recent statements by high-level Turkish officials suggest that Ankara has not excluded the possibility of independence if the proposed summit does not produce results amenable to Turkish interests—

United States access to facilities in the area, the Cypriots could call into question the status of the British Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus, and Turkey could restrict or halt operations at its NATO installations. Moreover, tensions between Greece and Turkey would escalate and could erupt into open conflict—to the ultimate detriment of NATO cohesion.

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- The United States currently uses Cyprus to resupply the multinational force in Lebanon—as do other force contributors. Over the past year, some 2,000 US support flights have transited Larnaca airport in the southern part of the island. The Cypriot Government has continued to allow the United States access to the facilities despite heavy domestic pressure from the Cypriot Communist Party and despite the consequent interference with commercial flight operations. Access to these facilities almost certainly would be jeopardized in the event of a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence.

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- Experience has shown that Turkish policymakers are careful, deliberate planners who hold their tactical and strategic cards close to their chest. We expect, therefore, to have little warning if the Turks decide to loosen their restraints on Denktash. Viewed from this perspective, the incremental shifts in Turkish diplomatic behavior—which suggest increased Turkish receptivity to Turkish Cypriot independence—assume increased significance

What implications would a unilateral declaration of independence have for US interests in the area?

The Greeks and Greek Cypriots would consider a unilateral declaration of independence as an extreme provocation and almost certainly would assume the United States had acquiesced in the decision; both the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots strongly believe that the United States has decisive influence in Ankara. Consequently, US-Greek and US-Cypriot relations almost certainly would reach their lowest ebb since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. US and NATO interests in Turkey also could be damaged in the likely event of a strongly negative Western reaction to Turkish Cypriot independence. In a worst case scenario, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots could deny the

- Under the set of treaties that established the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the United Kingdom was allowed to maintain two Sovereign Base Areas at Akrotiri and Dhekelia in southern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots could argue that independence for northern Cyprus has contravened the terms of the treaties establishing Cypriot independence and that British failure to stop the Turks and Turkish Cypriots from further altering the status quo has called into question the validity of these treaties.

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Akrotiri is also used as a staging area on an ad hoc basis in other Middle East contingencies as, for example, in the current operations in Lebanon

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- The escalation of tensions between Greece and Turkey would damage the effectiveness of NATO's southeastern flank. US and NATO actions taken to reduce the potential for hostilities almost certainly would be viewed as partial by one side or the other. Thus, in our judgment, the United States and NATO would find themselves in the same no-win situation that existed in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. [redacted]
- Anti-American sentiment in Greece almost certainly would flare up and spread across the political spectrum. Consequently, Athens probably would feel compelled to demonstrate its displeasure over the perceived US tilt toward Turkey. Under the worst conditions, it could renounce the recently completed US-Greek base agreement, which is currently awaiting parliamentary ratification, demand removal of the US bases, or even withdraw from NATO as it did in 1974. At a minimum, the Greeks probably would severely restrict operations at the US bases. [redacted]
- The US position in Turkey would also be likely to suffer as the United States attempted to balance the concerns of the two NATO allies. The almost certain critical Western reaction against a Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence—along with the recriminations against Ankara—probably would increase Ankara's sense of isolation from its Western allies at a time when Turkey is already stinging from Western criticism of the military government's domestic policies. In a worst case scenario, Ankara could, in reaction to likely Western criticism or censuring actions, restrict operations at the 26 NATO installations in Turkey, halt modernization at three bases in eastern Turkey (all of which are of potential use in certain Southwest Asian contingencies), and possibly even pull out of NATO. [redacted]
- Finally, both Athens and Ankara probably would begin to flirt with the Soviets in an effort to underscore their independence and to demonstrate their displeasure with the United States and NATO. [redacted]

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